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1. Introduction
Technological advancement generates tremendous changes of markets and
competitive structuresin the information era. With these changes, alliancerela-
tionshipsin the information technology industry have become as complicated as
before. They might reflectnot only the change of industrialstructures,but also
changing strategiesof individual companies. Thus we will investigate them, fo-
cusing on the semiconductor business.
(1) Overview of Semiconductor Industry
In the 1980's Japanese companies caught up with American companies by
investing theirresources on DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) and they
have kept their top position since the latter of 1980s. However, in the 1990s
American companies improved their performance in the field of MPU (Micro-
processor Unit), in which Japanese companies fell behind. With falling growth
rates,Japanese companies now face red ink.
However, just because American sales of semiconductors are surpassing that
of Japanese firms, it does not mean that the US firms are taking a commanding
lead in allfields.The one reason why Japanese companies grew so rapidlyin the
1980s is that there was strong demand for computers, home appliances and elec-
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Table 1-1 Global Competition of Semiconductor Business"
tronicsin the Japanese market. Now, the demand is strong for personal computers,
a fieldin which US-made chips have an advantage.
In fact,some Japanese companies have improved theirperformance as a re-
sultof increasing demand for personal computers in the American market. How-
ever, there is not much expectation that Japanese companies will improve their
growth in the future as long as they focus on DRAM production. According to
market forecastsof WSTS, MPU has much higher growth rates than DRAM from
now on. Intelis the best positioned company as business shiftsfrom DRAM to
MPU2).
If Japanese companies keep fallingbehind in the field of MPU, Japanese
companies will allow American companies to take hold on the core processor
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technology in the emerging multi-media society.What is worse, the competitive
advantage of Japanese companies, the process technology of DRAM, is no longer
the technology driver for semiconductor production. Recently there is no differ-
ence between production of MPU and DRAM.
There are yet other competitors for Japanese companies. Korean Electronics
firms,such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG, have been concentrating theirresources
on the DRAM field to catch up. Korean companies might reach thelevel of Japa-
nese companies in scale and technology, according to some reliableresources. In
fact,a Korean company, Samsung has entered into OEM agreements with some
Japanese companies to build very sophisticatedproduction equipment.
(2) Research Question
Japanese companies are exposed to severe competition and difficultmarket
conditions.In the DRAM field,Korean companies have caught up with Japanese
companies in technology. Meanwhile American companies dominate the market
for core products such as MPU. Japanese companies need new business strategies
for the future.
However, there are not so many options for Japanese firms. They have no
choice but to build on advantages they have in the DRAM field.However in the
DRAM field,it is becoming increasingly difficultto develop strategy based on
with a single company's resources,because ofintense global competition, thein-
creasingimportance of defacto standards, and the increasing cost of research and
development.
The purpose of this paper is to consider how strategicalliances evolve and
change, what characteristicsrecent strategicallianceshave. In addition, we look
into how Japanese companies should manage the alliancesforre-growth.
These research questions will be illustratedby two case studies,involving
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Toshiba and Hitachi. The reason why we have chosen these two companies is that
they have similar business structures and are focusing on DRAM as their core
businesses.
2. Case Study 1: Toshiba
(1) The Outline of Toshiba's Semiconductor Business
Toshiba was established in 1939 by the merger of two electrical equipment
marker, Shibaura Manufacturing and , Tokyo Electrical Company. During the
high economic growth period after the second world war, Toshiba grew with
heavy electrical equipment as its core business, and has now become a leading
company worldwide. It occupies second place after Hitachi in electrical machinery,
with gross annual sales of 361 billion yen in 1990, and assets of 3.214 billion yen.
However, Toshiba's current performance is supported by new information and
communication-related business rather than heavy electrical or home appliances
manufacturing. Toshiba appeared as a leading company in the semiconductor
business in 1982 when the "W-strategy", aiming to further advance the com-
pany's strength in the semiconductor business, was implemented. "W" had two
purposes, that first,to win competition in the semiconductor business, and second,
to develop that business world wide. It was an very ambitious strategy.
In order to implement this strategy, Toshiba aggressively invested in the
semiconductor business when rival makers, Hitachi and NEC, did not dared to in-
vest. Toshiba continued to invest heavily to establish clean rooms and LSI re-
search labs. The amount of investments rose to $5700 million from 1983 to 1988.
The Investment were five times as large as before the implementation the W strat-
egy, and as a result Toshiba overtook Hitachi in 1987, taking the second position
next to NEC in the world market.
One of the aims of the W strategy is to develop a solid and balanced base in
－44－
memory, logic, bipolar IC. For example, except for Bip Digital and Micon,
Toshiba occupied top three position in world in other product fields. This balance
is the main characteristic of Toshiba's business structure.
On the hand, one feature of Toshiba's semiconductor strategy is overseas op-
eration. Hitachi, NEC, Fujitsu have rushed to increase their production capacity
overseas as a reaction to the appreciation of the yen. However, Toshiba stillsticks
to domestic operations, keeping high export rates compared with rival companies.
Even though Toshiba manufactures semiconductors in Germany, US, and
Malaysia, these are only post-processing operation. In the case of pre-processing,
improvement in manufacturing are of the utmost importance to maintain and raise
profitability. In semiconductor production, pre-processing is the most important
Figure 2-1 Performance of Toshiba1'
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stage in the manufacturing process, so Toshiba keeps its pre-processing operation
at home, where improvements in production are most easily implemented.
Toshiba's strategies seem to run against the trend of internationalization.
However Toshiba has a unique approach to overseas investments. Toshiba has
been building strategic alliances with many foreign companies. Other rival compa-
nies, NEC and Hitachi, also build alliances with foreign companies, but Toshiba is
the only company which has experienced cooperation with foreign companies
from R&D to production. Whenever there is an emergent need to move produc-
tion facilitiesoverseas, Toshiba can transfer them by taking advantage of its coop-
eration with foreign companies. Until that sort of emergent need arises, Toshiba
strategically invest resources in order to enhance its competitive advantage in
mass production technology for DRAM.
Toshiba's strategy has been based on the management of strategic alliances
and refined mass production technology.
(2) The Development of Strategic Alliances
Toshiba started to build alliances with foreign companies before rival firms.
Toshiba is quite open to acquiring resources which they have not accumulated
previously from the outside. There is a principle for alliance in Toshiba; when
they build alliances with foreign companies the partner should be the best player
in this field2'.Toshiba's alliances have been growing rapidly in number, but in the
late 1980s there were not so many. Toshiba realized its strategic objective by
deepening alliance relationships with two companies, Motorola and Siemens.
The alliance with Motorola started under the following circumstances : while
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Motorola was the world leader in MPU production in 1985, it had been forced out
of the memory field due to competition from Japanese manufactures. In order to
get back to memory manufacturing, it proposed a partnership with the leader in 1
M DRAM technology and mass production.
Toshiba, while it was the leader in 1M DRAM, along with other Japanese
manufacturers, it was unable to compete with American companies in the MPU
field. Toshiba had been looking to strengthen its operation in this area. In other
words, the two companies' strategic intent for the future fitperfectly .
Since the establishment of a joint venture in 1987, the relationship has be-
come closer and closer every year. For example, in 1988, Toshiba began selling
32 bit MPU in Japan with OEM supply from Motorola. At this time the MPU
world market was dominated by two manufacturers, Motorola and Intel at this
time. Both manufacturers were the only companies to produce and sell by them-
selves. Toshiba was the firstmanufacturer besides of Motorola and Intel to sell 32
bit MPU.
Toshiba's relationship with Siemens began in 1985 with providing Siemens
with its DRAM technology. Building a partnership with Siemens placed Toshiba
in a solid market position in Europe where Toshiba did not have a high level of
recognition. The partnership also had the benefit of raising product image and ex-
panding the sales networks.
The relationship between the two companies rapidly expanded in 1985 and in
the following years joint development of one type of ASIC, the standard cell,and
joint second source agreements were worked out. In 1989 the partnership was ex-
panded as the demand for the standard cell greatly rose. Toshiba provides the de-
sign technology of Gate Array, which is said to have a market potential of $4600
million, to Siemens. Since then Siemens has become a second source and vendor
of this product. Through this alliance Toshiba increased its market share of Gate
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Table 2-1 Major Alliances of Toshiba3'
Array, which used to be weak. At the same time, joint development of ASIC led to
the development of the next generation of standard cell which is 30% faster than
the existing one.
The major characteristic of Toshiba's strategic alliances in the late 1980s is
that other alliances developed around these two companies. In addition, acquiring
technology and accessing foreign markets have been realized though the deepen-
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ing relationship with these two companies.
(3) Diversifying Alliance Relationships
Due to the rapid yen appreciation, and the increasing cost of R&D, it became
more difficult to adopt to the competitive environment in the 1990s. So there were
increasing needs to link up with external resources. In order to deal with the diffi-
cult environment, Toshiba diversified its alliance relationships and rearranged its
their partners for strategic purposes. For example, Toshiba built an alliance with
IBM in the flash memory business. They cooperated in fields of R&D, production,
and marketing. Toshiba also made an alliance with Samsung Electronics in which
Toshiba gives product information on flash memory to Samsung, and Samsung
produces flash memory based on that information.
Toshiba also has a similar alliance relationship with National Semiconductor.
The aim of diversifying alliance relationships is to get defacto standard in these
products. In flash memory market there are two types of products competing, one
is NAND which is developed by Intel, and the other NOR which is developed by
Toshiba.
In order to meet the increasing cost of R&D for new product generations,
such as 256M DRAM, Toshiba built alliances with IBM and Siemens for joint de-
velopment in 1992. In the following year they succeeded in developing a proto-
type.
One characteristic of Toshiba's vertical alliances is that they are diversified
for particular strategic purposes. To diversify relationships means not only realiz-
ing the strategic purpose but also hedging risk for the partners involved4'. The task
of building, maintaining , and advancing the relationships is quite difficult in the
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semiconductor industry which is exposed to rapid technological and market
change. In addition there are complicated relationships existing in the IC industry,
involving both cooperation and competition.
To develop effective strategic alliances, companies have to build at least two
core relationships with their partners, one dealing with existing technologies, the
other dealing with next generation technologies. Toshiba has recently tried to find
venture businesses having high potential for new technology development. In
short, Toshiba build alliances with companies which are similar to itself in scale
and have competitive advantage in the existing technological trajectory. At the
same time , Toshiba builds alliances with venture businesses to find technologic
seeds which lead to new technological trajectory.
Toshiba is involved in technological cooperation with Echelon to produce
semiconductors for decentralized processing which allow contact with other proc-
essors and are installed into other machines. In the ASIC field Toshiba has built
an alliance with Synapse to acquire design technology.
In addition to the companies mentioned above, Toshiba is actively promoting
relationships with those companies possessing a high level of technology regard-
less of the partner's company name or its size.
3. Case Study 2 : Hitachi
"In order to raise efficiency of R&D and to proceed standardization of tech-
nology for flash memory, we make a cooperation with Mitsubishi.""
Hitachi has built an alliance with Mitsubishi for joint research on flash mem-
ory technology. It is not unusual for both of them to build alliances with foreign
companies, for the purpose of saving investment in R&D, plant and equipment, or
shortening R&D time. But this alliance is different from others. The alliances be-
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tween Japanese large semiconductor manufacturers tend to be avoided, because
these companies are keenly competing in the same market in Japan and have until
now had special sensitivity to each other.
Thus we can expect that Hitachi attempt to change its business strategy
through the alliance.
(1) Corporate Business
Hitachi, whose market share of semiconductor business is 5th largest in the
world, is one of the biggest comprehensive electronics manufacturers in Japan.
Total amount of sale of the company is $ 3,811 billion.It has three major business
fields ; the firstis a business field of heavy electrical apparatus like equipment for
electric power and industrial and traffic systems ; the second is household elec-
Figure 3-1 Performance of Hitachi21
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tronic appliances such as televisionsets,VTR and so on ; the thirdisinformation
electronicequipment such as semiconductors, PC and telecommunication equip-
ment. Though the household electronicsfieldshas been very sluggish, under the
influence of Heisei Recession in Japan, the heavy electricalapparatus field,which
is a core business historicallyfor the company, shows stable growth and supports
the Hitachi group. Also the information electronic equipment business is increas-
ingly re-growing due to recovering of foreign business. In this business field,
sales of semiconductors amount to about $5,600 billionand it occupies 15.8% of
totalsale 1993.
(2) Present Situation of Semiconductor Business
In the domestic semiconductor business Hitachi is placed 3rd position after
NEC and Toshiba. In the field of MOS-memory, however, the company stands
firstand has a 12.4% world market share. And the company stands 7th in the field
of Logic IC, and 4th in MPU. It occupies 7.4% of world market share including all
kinds of semiconductors.
This business structure,where MOS-memory is the main business, has con-
tinued since the early 1980s when Hitachi was number one in the fieldof 256K
DRAM. Technological accumulation of DRAM technology as "Technology
Driver" created the current strength of the company based on the advantage of
manufacturing technology.
On the other hand, in the case of MPU business Hitachi startedin 1975 under
the contractof second source supply to Motorola Inc. Since then, Hitachi and Mo-
torola have maintained their relation for over ten years. However, Hitachi pro-
duces RISC for workstations as a member of a Hewlett-Pakard standardization
group at present.Also as a member of an IBM group, Hitachi makes IBM compat-
ible personal computers with Power PC.
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In the field of flash memory which is expected to be a main product in next
generation semiconductors, Hitachi tries to build a new standardization group with
Mitsubishi and SGS-Thomson of France.
(3) Strategy of Alliances in 1970s and 80s
Hitachi could build alliances with a lot of global companies by making its
manufacturing technology advanced and by utilizing it as the companys strength.
By that means Hitachi has been growing in the semiconductor business. In this
way, we can say that Hitachis success in this business fieldis based on alliances.
Full-scale of semiconductor production by Hitachi was started in 1975 based
on the second source agreement on MPU with Motorola. This was an indispensa-
ble process for Hitachi's technological development, because it enabled the com-
pany to accumulate its manufacturing technologies during its relation with Mo-
torola, which continued for over ten years. Thereby Hitachi had the firstposition
in the 256K DRAM field during this period.
After 1985, the strategy of semiconductor business of Hitachi has been
changing. With the technological development of Hitachi, its dependency on Mo-
torola diminished and their balance of power became on even ground. In 1986
their relation expanded to include joint development of 16 bit MPU, in which both
of them were equal partners.
It those days, Hitachi began to made alliances with other foreign companies.
For example, the company gained a license to production and sales of CMOS
Logic IC from Fairchild in 1986, and tied up with VLSI concerning OEM supply
of customized IC in 1987. After this, the company built an alliance with TI con-
cerning joint development of 16M DRAM in 1988 and supplied SRAM for TI ac-
cording to an OEM agreement in 1989.
Like this,from the end of 1980s to the early 1990s Hitachi entered into coop-
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Table 3-1 Major Alliances of Hitachi (1985-1989)3)
eration with a lot of the foreign companies in various fieldsof the semiconductor
business,in order to gain internationalcompetitive advantages.
(4) New Phase of Strategic Alliances
In the 1990s the semiconductor business faces a huge transitionof the busi-
ness environment like multi-media, down-sizing and networking. With this tran-
sition,the position of DRAM as a technology driveris losing ground, and instead
MPU is gettingmore important. The links between semiconductors as components
and final products getting much stronger,as we can see for example in personal
computers. The verticalrelationswith both software and hardware sidesinfluence
the whole semiconductor business more than ever.
Therefore Hitachi,just as other Japanese manufactures, which do not have
MPU technology and is behind other foreign companies on the software technol-
ogy, must build allianceswith foreign companies which try to proceed the global
standardizationstrategy(including defacto standard).
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In such a turbulent situation, Hitachi selected Hewlett-Pakard (HP) as a part-
ner to introduce RISC type MPU technology. Their relation has continued since
1982 and now they know each other well. In this way, this alliances can be said to
have advanced from a one-way relation to a two-way one. At present, however,
Hitachi cooperation in the field of RISC is not restricted to only HP. Hitachi tied
up with Sun Microsystems to collaborate in the production of RISC, the latter is
competing with HP in the workstation business. Consequently, Hitachis alliances
on RISC became more complicated. And at the same time the number of alliances
with US small venture business (VB) which have advanced software technologies,
are increasing recently. These relationships between Hitachi and these VB are
complementary, that is to say Hitachi is getting advanced technology and VB are
getting money and production technology.
Furthermore, the early 1990s is a turning point for semiconductor industry
Table 3-2 Major Alliances of Hitachi (1989 - 1994)4)
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around the world.
The laws like four times larger the every three years and Silicon Cycle have
become irregular. And the scale of investments in equipment and R&D is becom-
ing huge in order to cope with large sizing of DRAM. However, most Japanese
companies is shrank theirinvestments because of the economic recession in Japan.
Such situation has driven Japanese semiconductor manufacturers into alliances
with large foreign competitors. That is to say, large-sized investments and the
economic recession promoted alliances among large companies. A joint venture
established with TI in 1995 is a typical case for Hitachi. In this project, the capital
fund $15 billion will be financed not only by both companies but also by other
companies such as suppliers, banks and customers. The joint venture will con-
struct a $500 million plant for 16M DRAM and 64M DRAM in USA.
Another feature of Hitachis alliances in recent years is a closer relation with a
Korean company, LG. Hitachi supplied 1M DRAM technology in 1989 and 4M
DRAM technology in 1991 to LG. Hitachi seemed to have been a pioneer who
proceeded to enter into corporation with a Korean company in those days and now
their relation becomes much stronger. Hitachi gets 1-4 million 4M DRAMs from
LG, thanks to agreement according to which the latter should to supply half its
amount of production to Hitachi. Also they tied up regarding the technological
supply of 16M DRAM. In the future, Hitachi will get the same amount 16M
DRAMs from LG.
On the other hand, Hitachi entered into corporation with a Japanese competi-
tor, Mitsubishi, with respect to flash memory as mentioned at the beginning of this
section. Flash memory will be a key product in the near future if itis standardized.
In this way this alliance is a new step for both companies, though alliances be-
tween large Japanese companies has been taboo in Japan so far. Anyway the in-
tense to dominate the world market by Hitachi and Mitsubishi might make the in-
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ter-firm relations and competitive situation more complex.
4. Analysis
In the early 1990s semiconductor market became divided into two types.;
one is the commodity type of semiconductors such as DRAM and DISCREET, the
other is MPU which has scarcity value technologically. Though the latter type
keeps high and stable profit, most Japanese manufacturers depend on the former
type that cannot maintain high profit. In such a context, Japanese companies have
increased alliances with foreign companies more than ever, as mentioned before.
Moreover patterns are changing.
(1) Transitions of Alliance Patterns
According to our case studies strategic alliances can be divided into three
phases. They can be called (l)Single-front Line Alliance, (2)Multi-front Lines
Alliance, (3)Multi-dimensional Alliance.
a. Single-front Line Alliance
The firststage lasted from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. In this period,
most of Japanese manufacturers had technologies that were less advanced than
those of the US or European companies in this period. Then, Japanese manufac-
tures tried to gain their own international competitive edge in the focused business
Figure 4-1 Single-front Line Alliance
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field.Therefore each of them enteredinto an alliancewith a specificforeign com-
pany and deepened the relationship.This type can be called Single-front Line Al-
liance".
b. Multi-front Lines Alliance
The second stage lasted from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. In this pe-
riod Japanese manufacturers advanced their technologies by leaps and bounds.
They could get rid of the one-way dependence on US or European companies by
building complementary relationships.There were various types of allianceslike
technological supply, OEM production, joint development and so on. Moreover
each company had to ally with differentcompanies depending on the situations,
because theirproducts or markets became diverse,changeable and complex. Thus
Japanese companies had to cope with complicated situationsin which they fought
or alliedwith many other companies. This can be called Multi-front Lines Alli-
ance21.
Figure 4-2 Multi-frontLine Alliance
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The thirdstage startedfrom the mid 1990s, when semiconductor industry are
confronted with unprecedented environmental changes. We can point out the fea-
tures of the transitionsof recent semiconductor business as following.
Figure 4-3 Multi-dimensionalAlliance
Partners of Alliances
The firstfeatureis that the partners are not restrictedto American or Euro-
pean firms. Until 1990s, the partners of Japanese semiconductor manufacturers
were only American or European companies regardless of the size of these com-
panies. Not only in the period from 1970s to early 1980s, when US companies
technologically overwhelmed Japanese, but even in thelate 1980s when Japanese
companies had already become competitive, the partners of Japanese companies
were American or European firms.
However since 1993, the number of Japanese-Korean alliancesis increasing.
One of the reasons is that the demand for DRAM is rapidlyincreasing, due to the
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recover of computer market in the US. And the other reason is that the product life
cycle of semiconductor reaches the period of maturity. Under such conditions,
Japanese and Korean semiconductor suppliers intend to avoid price competition
through these alliances.
Besides these Japanese-Korean alliances, we can since recently observe a
trend toward Japanese-Japanese alliances. The main purposes of the alliances with
US and European companies were to share resources and reduce R&D cost. In the
case of alliances among Japanese companies, however, the partners want to build
a market leader group through realizing the technological standardization. There-
fore, these alliances may be seen as more strategic natures.
Alliances with VB
A second feature is that the number of alliances with venture businesses is in-
creasing. The alliances among Japanese large companies and with US venture
businesses are very common, though we can not find many articles about them in
the database.
Production of advanced semiconductors requires high-level manufacturing
technologies and a lot of investment, even if small VB has sophisticated design
technologies. That is why they cannot produce such semiconductors by them-
selves. Manufacturing MPU and ASIC requires rather advanced process technol-
ogy, though MPU and ASIC did not need as high-level manufacturing technolo-
gies as DRAM in the past. In fact, Intel's process technology attains the highest
level in the world, and this company invests in equipment and R&D not less than
Japanese manufacturers. The era, when companies could become competitive
based only on design technology has passed. Therefore VB being short of money
are positively trying to approach Japanese companies.
Moreover, as each final product requires the development of semiconductors
suitable for it, the variety of semiconductors is increasing. This is also the reason
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why the number of alliances with VB is increasing.
Vertical Alliances
The third feature is that vertical alliances with downstream or upstream com-
panies are increasing adding to horizontal alliances. Relations between semicon-
ductor manufacturers and set maker, the makers of final product were mainly cus-
tomers-suppliers relations based on their trade, but now these become much
closer. They include inter-firm development collaboration called "design-in".
Some researchers have pointed out that this was the strength of Japanese manufac-
turers whose business were comprehensive3'.
Currently the number of a new type of collaboration called "concept-in" is
increasing. It means that companies in partnership collaborate from the phase of
concept making of products. In short, the relationships evolve from supplier-cus-
tomer to cross-industry relationship, in other words, the deepening of vertical re-
lationship. Such a transition of inter-firm relationship can be seen in the relations
with software companies. Thus, alliances with companies in upstream, down-
stream or different industries become an indispensable strategy for survival in the
semiconductor business.
In short, alliances have evolved from Multi-front Lines Alliance to Multi-di-
mensional Alliance.
5. In Conclusion
However such environmental changes are not only risk but chance for com-
panies. Semiconductors which have continuously advanced will not stop their pro-
gress. Flash memories, FRAM, and/or other special semiconductors after DRAM
and MPU will appear and become major products in near future.
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Under such conditions, Japanese companies have a chance to recover a top
position in semiconductor business through new types of strategic alliances.
The first point is to recognize that inter-firm relations are continuously
evolving. The inter-firm relations influence each other and change themselves.
The more complicated technologies become, the lower the borders among indus-
tries or companies will be. Sometimes they may change the whole industry. If
Japanese companies do not consider their inter-firm relations from the view of
their present business domain based on horizontal inter-firm relations, but if they
try to consider from the multi-dimensional views to fuse other business into their
business domain, they may be able to expand their chances to create a new busi-
ness or a new industry in the future. At that time, it may become an advantage for
Japanese semiconductor manufacturers as comprehensive electronics companies.
The second point is to understand multi dimensional relations and to interpret
them in content of the vision and strategy of corporation as a whole. When the
company change or rearrange inter-firm relations with partners or competitors in
the turbulent environment, some contradictions might be brought about in individ-
ual relations. If each relation is not linked with corporate vision and strategy, it
might lead to a long-term disadvantage. The weight of each relation in the multi-
dimensional alliances is lower than in the single-front line alliance. As a result, it
becomes very important to keep total balance of multi-dimensional alliances as a
whole.
In summing up, how to manage the multi-dimensional relationships is a key
factor of success for Japanese semiconductor manufacturers.
References
1. Hamel G., and C. K. Prahalad (1994), Competing for the Future, HBS Press,Boston
2. Matsumoto Tsuguo (1994), Interview Report, Weekly Toyokeizai, 5/Feb./1994,
Toyokeizai, Tokyo
－62－
3. Nakagawa Yasuzo (1989), Toshiba's Semiconductor Strategy, Diamond Publishing
Firms, Tokyo
4. Prahalad C. K., and G. Hamel (1989), 'The Core Competence of the Corporation',
Strategy, HBS Press,Boston.
5. Shimizu Kinichi (1989), Changing Business Structure of Hitachi, TBS Britanica,
Tokyo
6. Teramoto, Iwasaki and Takai (1993), 'New Era of Strategic Alliance', Grand Strat-
egy, Japan Management Association Management Center, Tokyo
－63－
